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AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW IN ITS
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
SHOULD THE RESTATEMENT BE "CONTINUED"? *
Albert A. Ehrenzweig t
"Transition," "crisis," or search for compromise-few will deny
the existence of a rift in the theory and practice of American conflicts
law. When some insist on "logical" solutions while others acquiesce
in "justice" from case to case, when some reject as obsolete whole
bodies of doctrine while others warn of innovation, we must be on our
guard. Yet as early as twenty years ago, the American Law Institute
tried by majority vote and fiat to cut through doubt and search by the
publication of a "Restatement" in which dogmatic generalizations
tended to by-pass the complexities of a growing law.
The number of references to this text in court decisions are an
unreliable test of its soundness. Fair judgment would above all require
a count of those decisions actually affected by the Restatement; for, in
what at first glance appears to be the vast majority of the pertinent
cases, reliance on the Restatement relates to situations in which the
contact stressed in the "rule" invoked, such as the place of "contracting"
(§ 332) or the place of the "last event" (§ 377), coincides with most
or all other contacts. Moreover, it would be necessary to ascertain in
how many of the remaining cases the court was either misguided by
an all-too-broad proposition of the Restaters or compelled to escape
such a proposition by resorting to "public policy" (§ 612), "procedure"
* See AmEiciAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAV CONTINUED 33
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1953) ; id. at 37 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954).
t Professor of Law, University of California; School of Law, Berkeley.
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(§ 585), or such almost exclusionary "exceptions" as the place of per-
formance provision (§ 358) in contracts law.
Responding to much criticism based on unfavorable answers to
these questions in certain fields, the American Law Institute is now
engaged in a wholesale revision of its venture. Whether cure and
progress may be expected from a mere "continuation," or whether new
techniques have to be devised can, I believe, best be judged from the
distance and with the detachment of historical analysis. An introduc-
tion to such an analysis is attempted in this Article.1
For this purpose the history of conflicts law can perhaps best be
understood as a struggle between two tendencies, both of which con-
tinue to compete in the Restatement: one we may call unitarian, seeking
to resolve or avoid conflict by the assumption of a superior legal order;
the other we may call pluralistic, seeking to achieve this result by
insisting on the exclusivity of each nation's (or state's) own law.
The early interplay of these tendencies can be followed in Professor
Yntema's masterful sketch on the "Historic Bases of Private Inter-
national Law" -from a prenatal stage in the Empires of Rome and
England, in which denial of conflict was supported by the political
reality of "one world" and mercantile internationalism in law and
trade-through early pluralistic inroads into unitarian thinking, vari-
ously expressed by the later "statutists" and partly neutralized by
canonist and other natural law teaching-to the vigorous nationalism
of the newly born sovereignties with their stress on mere "comity"
in international relations. 'What remains to be done in order to see
the problem of American conflicts law as created by Story and restated
by Beale in its historical setting, is to analyze the doctrinal sources and
results of their compromise from the near-denial of conflicts law under
the pluralistic Dutch doctrine of comity, through the super-law concept
1. On the history of American conflict of laws, see 3 BEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS
1879 (1935); CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1953); YNTEMNA, The Historic Bases of Private International Law,
2 AM. J. Comp. L. 297 (1953); Rheinstein, Das Kollisionsrecht irn System des
Verfassungsrechts der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 1 FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERNSTr
RABEL 539 (1954). For European literature see particularly Gutzwiller, Le
Diveloppement Historique du Droit Intern. Privi, 29 REc. Ac. DR. INT. 291
(France 1929); LAINA, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVA (2 vol.
1888) ; NEUMEYER, DIE GEMEINRECHTLICHE ENTWVICKELUNG DES INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVAT- UND STRAFRECHTS BIS BARTOLUS (1916); Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the
History of English Law, 3 LAw: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, 344 (N.Y.
University 1937); GIHL, DEx INTERNATIONELLA PRIVATRXTENS HISTORIA OCH
ALLMANNA PRINCIPER (1951); Socini, Considerazioni sul Concetto Norte-Ainericano
del Diritto Internazionale Privato, 29 ANN. DI DR. COM,. E DI STUDI LEGISL. 99
(1953). Cf. BATIFFOL, TRAITk ELtMENTAIRE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL Pmrvt 7 et
seq. (1949) ; 1 PiI1gr, TRAIT. PRAcTIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PPRI- 22 et seq.
(1923). For South America see, e.g., 1 RomERO DEL PRADO, MANUAL DE DERcHo
INTERNACIONAL PRvADO 395 (1944).
2. Yntema, supra note 1.
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of international jurisdiction, to the opinions of Justice Holmes and the
hybrid Restatement of Conflict of Laws; and again from Judge Learned
Hand's transitional "localism," through the new beginnings of Stone,
Cook and Lorenzen, to the problems of our time.
FAILURE OF A COMPROMISE: "No LAW" AND "SUPER-LAW"
No Law: "'Comity of Nations"
American conflicts law begins with Joseph Story. When this
great scholar and judge wrote his commentaries,3 American courts had
not yet fully recognized the need for, and the existence of, such a law.
International conflicts problems were largely held governed by inter-
national law,4 and interstate conflicts were minimized by the continued
recognition of a general commercial law as well as by the existence of
what then was an at least nearly uniform common law.5 It was with
regard to the comparatively isolated legislative encroachments upon
this law and certain topics of personal law exposed to particularistic
tendencies 0 that the choice of law first became a problem in this country.
Marriage prohibitions, usury laws and insolvency statutes were among
the earliest examples, and the code law of Louisiana produced the first
American treatise on the conflict of laws.7
Neither Roman nor English law offered much assistance in the
solution of these new problems, both sharing the imperial privilege to
deny or avoid "conflicts" of law. Ancient Rome had achieved this by
having the foreigner, incapable of having a law of his own,' at first
3. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLICF OF LAWvS (1st ed. 1834). See
Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-One Hundred Years After,
48 HARv. L. REV. 15 (1934); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws:
Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1945); Nadelmann, Joseph Story's
Sketch of American Law, 3 Am. J. CoMI,. L. 3 (1954); Valladao, The Influence
of Joseph Story on Latin-Atmierican Rules of Conflict of Laws, id. at 27.
4. Miller v. Hall, 1 Dall. 229, 232-33 (Pa. 1788) (". . . mutual convenience,
policy, the consent of nations, and the general principles of justice form a code
which pervades all nations and must be everywhere acknowledged and pursued.")
Cf. 1 CRossiyY, op. cit. supra note 1 at 549.
5. Cf. Steinmetz v. Currie, 1 Dall. 270, 272 (Pa. 1788), relying on "general
mercantile law" rather than the "local regulations of Pennsylvania," as if the case
"had been determined in France, Spain or Holland, as well as in England." See also
Miller v. Hall, 1 DalI. 229 (Pa. 1788) ; 1 SwiFT, A SYSTEM OF LAws OF THE STATE
OF CONNECTICUT 41 (1795). Concerning the uniform common law of the time, see
1 HOFFMAN, COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 415 (2d ed. 1836); Story, American Law,
3 Amt. J. CoMP. L. 9, 11, 24 (1954).
6. "Marriage, divorce, wills, and succession" are enumerated as the most im-
portant topics on the title page of STORY, COMMENTARIES, Op. cit. supra note 3.
7. LIvERMoRE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM THE
CONTRARIETY OF THE PosilvE LAws OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS (New
Orleans, 1828).
8. In ancient civilizations aliens seem to have been treated as lawless. See
BATIFFOL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 7 et seq.
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apply and later create Roman law; ' medieval Roman doctrine, though
allocating legislative power to the several units of the declining empire,10
had continued to think in terms of the all-embracing sovereignties of
Pope " and Emperor. English law, while partly followifig Roman
doctrine,'2 had reached a similar result by the exclusion of foreign
contacts: the jury was not to pass upon foreign facts,'3 and the deed
made 14 or tort committed '5 abroad could not be sued on in England.
Although in the course of time mercantile needs had broken down these
barriers and forced upon English courts jurisdiction over foreign
facts,'" these courts had continued to forestall conflict by insisting on
the application of English law.' 7  If resort to both Roman and common
law sources thus failed American courts, they sought and found guid-
ance in other legal systems.
Some of the American colonies had strong ethnical and cultural
ties with the Netherlands. With regard to the treatment of inter-
national problems, these ties may have proved particularly effective in
the early history of the United States which, like the Netherlands, had
gained its independence from an empire; and British law itself had had
early contact with Dutch legal scholarship. Whatever may have been
the reason, this scholarship, primarily the writings of Ulric Huber and
Johannes Voet with their rejection of the imperial heritage of a law
"governing" by virtue of its own claim to authority "' and their stress
9. See, e.g., Meili, Uber das Historische Debfit der Doktrin des Internatonalen
Privat- und Strafrechts, 9 Z. INT. SmR. PR. 1 (Germany 1899); Rabel, Book Review,
22 Z. IxT. R. 331 (Germany 1912).
10. On the theory of the "statutists," see in general Yntema, supra note 1, at 303.
11. On the conflicts law of the canonists, see NEuMEYER, op. it. supra note 1,
at 113; Van Hove, La territorialiti et la personnalit des lois en droit canomique'
depuis Gratien (vers 1140) jusqu'4 Jean Anderae (- 1348), 3 TIJDSCHRv VOOR
RE HTSGEScH. 277 (Netherlands 1922).
12. Cf. HENRY, THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF DEMFERARA, Erc. (1823);
BURGE, COMMENTARIES ON COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAw (1838).
13. See in general Sack, mspra note 1, at 346.
14. Anonymous, Yearbooks, 2 Edw. II (1308), 17 Selden Soc'y 110.
15. Pape v. The Merchants of Florence in London, 9 Edw. I (Coram Rege
Roll 64, 1281), 46 Selden Soc'y 34. See, in general, Sack, mpra note 1, at 342:
Rheinstein, supra note 1, at 583.
16. For an example illustrating the use of fictions for this purpose, see
Anonymous, cited in Ward's Case, Latch 3, 82 Eng. Rep. 245 (K.B. 1625),
where it was held that, while there would be no jurisdiction in a case involving an
obligation created in Athlone, Ireland, the obligation could be sued on "entant
Athlone poet estre alleadge destre diens Angliterre' (if Athlone were alleged
to be in England). In general see Rheinstein, supra note 1, at 584.
17. Cf. Tucker v. Cappes & Jones, 2 Rolle 497, 81 Eng. Rep. 940 (K.B. 1624).
In a suit on a contract made and to be performed in Virginia, Doderidge, J. would,
in contrast to Whitlock, J. (who had affirmed admiralty jurisdiction because the
"civil ley" was applicable), apparently, at the plaintiff's choice, have permitted ap-
plication of the common law in a common law court.
18. On this "statutist" theory, see, e.g., Yntema, supra note 1, at 303.
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upon mere comity as the basis of applying foreign law, 9 was to gain
great influence on the development of American conflicts law. Follow-
ing earlier cases approving this approach,20 Story relied primarily upon
Huber's authority for which he found "undisputed preference on this
subject over other continental jurists, as well in England as in
America." Citing Huber, he states that "whatever force and obliga-
tion the laws of one country have in another, depends solely upon the
laws, and municipal regulations of the latter, that is to say, upon its own
proper jurisprudence and polity, and upon its own express and tacit
consent." 2I Rejecting Continental attempts at establishing principles
entitled to general recognition, Story approved ' the statement in
Saul v. His Creditorss that this problem "touched the comity of
nations, and that, that comity is, and ever must be uncertain."
But this practice, while workable and proper enough in inter-
national relations, would soon have proved inadequate within the
American Union. Louisiana courts, obligated to apply a legal system
essentially different from that of other states, were in particular need
of "certain principles." '4 It is understandable, therefore, that the
Louisiana lawyer Livermore had declared the "modem" doctrine of
courtesy "inconsistent with the very nature of a court of justice." 5
Although "comity" language nevertheless has remained with us until
19. See Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE
CONFLICT Op, LAws 136 (1947); Davies, The Influence of Huber's "De Conflictu
Legum" on English Private International Law, 18 Brr. Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (Gr. Brit.
1937); Kuhn, Doctrines of Private International Law in England and America
Contrasted with those of Continental Europe, 12 COL. L. Ray. 44, 46 (1912). On
Dutch influence, see, e.g., Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom it; Seventeenth
Century New England, 31 COL. L. REv. 416, 428 (1931); VAN LAER, MINUTES OF
THE COURT OF ALBANY, RENSELAERSWYCK AND SCHENECTADY 1668-1673 (1926);
MORRIS, SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF Nmv YoRax CIT= 1674-1784, pp. 42,
58 (1935).
20. Cf. the comprehensive quotation from Huber in Emory v. Grenough, 3 Dall.
368, 369-77n. (U.S. 1797). But Cf. JAMES SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY OF LAND
TITLES IN MASSACHUSETTS 352 et seq. (1801), objecting to the authority of
Huber, "often recurred to in our courts," in matters of commercial contracts properly
subject to federal regulation. On Huber's influence upon Lord Mansfield, see
Rheinstein, supra note 1, at 585.
21. STORY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 32, 34. See also Aumann, The Influence of
English and Civil Law Principles upon the American Legal System During the
Critical Post-Revolutionary Period, 12 U. OF CIN. L. Rxv. 289 (1938); Pound,
The Place of Judge Story in the Making of American Law, 48 Am. L. REv. 676,
685, 687, 693, 694 (1914). Story's predominant reliance upon Continental sources
has in part been explained by the availability to him of Livermore's collection of
medieval treatises. Valladio, supra note 3, at 30.
22. STORY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 29.
23. Saul v. His Creditors, 5 MART. (N.s.) 569, 596 (La. 1827).
24. LvEaioRE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 15. Concerning the influence of Louisiana
law on Story, see Valladdo, supra note 3, at 30.
25. LIvERmoRE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 171, 172.
138 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103
the present day,' it was soon combined with theories better adapted
to the needs of a country in which not only growing intercourse be-
tween member states demanded interstate law, but where the relations
between states soon became less significant than relations between in-
dividuals whose very citizenship in the several states steadily lost
meaning. Jurisdiction became the first vehicle of a new super-law of
conflicts.
Super-Law
Judicial Jurisdiction
It has never been doubted that judgments recovered in the courts
of one state are entitled to recognition in sister states, although the
courts may at first have failed to utilize the Full Faith and Credit
Clause for this purpose." But where compulsion rather than comity
was to apply, some test had to be provided for the applicability of this
compulsion. This test was based on the concept of the foreign court's
"jurisdiction,"-a concept which was thus started on its victorious
career both in interstate and international relations.
This extension of the concept of jurisdiction beyond its application
to the forum's domestic authority-an application well-known to the
Roman and Canon law of the Middle Ages -- would not have caused
difficulties more serious than those of terminology had it remained
confined to interstate conflicts under the constitutional doctrine of full
faith and credit or due process. But to this day the jurisdictional ap-
proach has been applied in both interstate and international conflicts
law,29 and has thus necessarily had to be predicated upon a supernational
standard which, since the eclipse of the law of nations in both fields,
has lacked a positive legal foundation. Historical analysis confirms
26. For an excellent analysis of the comity theory in American law, see
Cheatham, supra note 3, at 374. Regarding the current uses of the term, cf.
NussBAum, PRINCCPLEs OF PRIvATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1943). "The mis-
leading word 'comity' has been responsible for much of the trouble.' Cardozo, J.,
in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918).
27. Jackson, Fidl Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution,
45 Co. L. Rav. 1, 7 (1945).
28. Cf. ALBERici DE RosATE, DicTiONIARiUm JuRIS TAm CivlLis, QUAm
CANONICI (1623) defining in reliance on Azo's Summa "jurisdiction" as the power
to adjudicate. For an early use of the term in a conflicts setting, see the statute
of Vercelli (1225) invalidating instruments prepared by notaries "de aliena
jurisdictione." 2 NEuMEVER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 46. In classic Rome, "terri-
torial" jurisdiction was said to be based on the magistrate's right to frighten
("terrere") those within his territory. WENGER, INsTITUTEs OF THE ROmAN LAW
OF CiviL. PROcEDuRE 39 n.32 (trans. Fisk 1940).
29. See, e.g., Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1951), where the
Ohio court, denying recognition to a Quebec judgment against a nonresident motorist,
found lack of "jurisdiction" in the rendering state in non-compliance with "due
process."
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this observation and, also, establishes the fact that this super-law of
jurisdiction, far from being logically indispensable as the Restaters
would lead us to believe, owes its present prevalence in the conflict of
laws to one man-Joseph Story, the judge and scholar.
According to Story it is a "lawful" " or "legitimate" "' jurisdic-
tion, "rightfully exercised," a which entitles the judgment of a foreign
court to recognition in this country. This concept of jurisdiction Story
apparently identifies with what he also refers to as "jurisdiction inter
gentes, upon principles of public [international] law." n Thus, for
laying down the "true doctrine," ' he relies on Vattel who, in connec-
tion with his discussion of the "rights of jurisdiction," remarks that
"to undertake to examine the justice of a definitive [foreign] sentence
is an attack on the jurisdiction of him [the sovereign] who has passed
it." "' And Story's precedents taken from the law of admiralty are, of
course, equally predicated upon concepts of public international law."0
Where, on the other hand, Story leaves the laws of nations and
admiralty and enters upon what we call today the law of conflict of
laws, he has to break new ground in evaluating a foreign judgment with
reference to a jurisdiction whose lawfulness is measured by standards
other than those of the rendering court. Most of the cases relied on by
Story concern the forum's own "local" rather than the foreign court's
"international" or "interstate" jurisdiction." This is particularly true
for the equity cases dealing with the forum's authority to interfere with
foreign lands "without affecting the jurisdiction of the Courts" of the
30. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed. 1834) 492.
31. Id. at 458.
32. Id. at 450, 453.
33. Id. at 445. See also id. at 468.
34. Id. at 450.
35. VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 165 (1758, transl. and ed. Chitty and In-
graham 1861).
36. See particularly Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch
241, 269, 270 (U.S. 1808) from'which Story quotes extensively (op. cit. supra
note 30, at 493) in explaining the concept of "lawful jurisdiction" of a foreign
court. After declaring that in an admiralty case "upon principle . . . to a certain
extent, the capacity of the court . . .may be considered by that tribunal which
is to decide on the effect of the sentence," Marshall approved what he declared to
be English practice under which recognition of foreign judgments "is uniformly
qualified with the limitation that [the foreign court] has, in the given case, juris-
diction of the subject matter." In the cases cited by Chief Justice Marshall [The
Flad Oyen, 1 Rob. Chr. 134 (High Ct. of Adm. 1799), The Henrick and Maria, 4
Rob. Chr. 43 (High Ct. of Adm. 1799), The Comet, 5 Rob. Chr. 285 (High Ct. of
Adm. 1804), The Helena, 4 Rob. Chr. 3 (High Ct. of Adm. 1801)] foreign acts of
condemnation and sale were examined under the law of nations.
37. LoRENZEN AND STUMMERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 15 (6th ed. 1951). Nussbaum prefers for the same concepts the terms "direct"
and "indirect" jurisdiction. NussaAum, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 241 (1943).
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foreign situs.8 s It may be significant, therefore, that for his proposi-
tion that "every exertion of authority [by a sovereign beyond its own
territorial limits though in accordance with its own laws] . . is a
mere nullity, and incapable of binding . . in any other tribunals," "
Story cites only his own opinion in Picquet v. Swan,4° where the
forum's jurisdiction over a nonresident citizen was denied for lack of
proper service.
The non-admiralty precedent primarily relied upon by Story in
this case, as well as in his text,41 is the well-known case of Buchanan v.
Rucker.42 Even here Lord Ellenborough, while denying the Island of
Tobago the power "to bind the rights of the whole world" 4 by a judg-
ment based on service violating minimum standards of fair notice, was
careful not to deny Tobago's jurisdiction under her own law.
It is true that, nevertheless, Story's concept of a jurisdiction in-
dependent from the laws of both the rendering court and the forum was
probably not unknown to the courts of his time. As early as 1786, in
Kibbe v. Kibbe,"4 one of the earliest cases reported in this country,
involving a suit in Connecticut on a Massachusetts judgment, the de-
fendant countered the plaintiff's reliance on the fact that the proceedings
underlying that judgment "were conformable to the laws and customs"
of Massachusetts, by claiming that these proceedings were "altogether
38. STORy, op. cit. supra note 30, at 456, 457, quoting with approval from
Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 Ves. 170, 183, 30 Eng. Rep. 952, 959 (1796), where de-
fendant was held liable to reconvey an estate in the West Indies which he had"unconscionably" acquired under the decree of a local court whose jurisdiction
was not denied. All of the equity cases cited by Story, op. cit. supra note 30, at
455 et seq., for his concept of (international) jurisdiction merely deal with the
forum's authority to intercede as to foreign land. See, e.g., White v. Hall, 12 Ves.
321, 33 Eng. Rep. 122 (1806) (expressly recognizing the foreign court's "intrinsic"
jurisdiction). Perhaps the earliest case raising the possibility that "jurisdictions
might clash" is Comes Arglasse v. Muschamp, [1682] 1 Vern. 75, 134, overruling
defendant's plea to the jurisdiction in a case involving land in Ireland, as "only
a jest put upon the jurisdiction of this court by the common lawyers" who wish
to deny equity's power to bind the conscience. See in general, Currie, Full Faith and
Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHi. L. REv. 620 (1954).
39. SToRy, op. cit. supra note 30, at 450.
40. Picquet v. Swan, 5 Mason 35 (C.C. Mass. 1828).
41. Story, op. cit. supra note 30, at 492.
42. 9 East 192 (1808).
43. Eight years later Lord Ellenborough, in Cavan v. Stewart, 1 Stark. 525,
528, 171 Eng. Rep. 551, 552 (1816) derived the invalidity of a Jamaica judgment
against a defendant not properly notified, from "the first principles of justice," a
phrase borrowed from Lord Chief Justice De Grey's opinion in Fisher v. Lane, 3
Wilson 297, 302 (1772) who seemed to identify these principles with the law of
England. "aThe twenty-seven colonies abroad cannot make a law contrary to the
law of England, but they can make any law agreeable thereto, and to the principles
of justice," Fisher v. Lane, supra at 303). See also Turnbull v. Walker, 67 L.T.
767 (Q.B. 1892) per Wright J.; Pemberton v. Hughes [1899] 1 Ch. 781; and in
general Borm-Reid, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgnents, 3 INT.
Come. L.Q. 49 (1954).
44. Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby 119 (Conn. 1786).
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illegal, and not conformable to or warranted by the laws of this state
[Connecticut?] or any other." " And the court apparently adopted
the defendant's argument by holding that Massachusetts "had no legal
jurisdiction of the cause." 46 That this approach was, however, far
from generally accepted, 47 appears from a case decided twenty-five years
later in Massachusetts where the court, giving full faith and credit to
a New Hampshire judgment, limited its inquiry to an examination of
"the manner in which a particular jurisdiction is exercised, according
to its own regulations and the laws of the state from whence an au-
thenticated judgment is taken," 48 and distinguished the Kibbe holding
as a "violent expedient[s], to which recourse was had to avoid a con-
struction at which courts of justice naturally revolt . . ." 4 It was
left to Story then to give authority to super-law standards of jurisdic-
tion.
When adopting these standards for judging the "lawfulness" of
foreign jurisdiction under a law other than that of the rendering
court, Story might well have chosen another term for distinguishing
from this "international" jurisdiction the "local" jurisdiction of the
forum. His failure to do so and his use of the term "jurisdiction" with
reference to both the forum and the foreign court would have been
serious enough had this jurisdictional language remained limited to
the law of recognition of foreign judgments. But Professor Beale and
the Restatement have carried it far beyond this field into the law of
choice of law by their discovery of "legislative jurisdiction."
Legislative Jurisdiction
Comity had threatened to "put the conflict of laws out of joint
and . . . placed the whole subject on a basis where it nearly per-
ished." "I In the choice of law, too, a new approach was needed.
Unfortunately it was found in a false analogy to that "territorial
theory" " under which a foreign judgment was held entitled to recogni-
tion if issuing from a court having "lawful jurisdiction" in an inter-
45. Id. at 125.
46. Id. at 126.
47. See also the following early cases relied on by Story: Phelps v. Holker,
1 Dall. 261 (Pa. 1788) (denying recognition without resort to jurisdictional lan-
guage); Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424 (N.Y. 1806) (refusing to recognize a
Vermont divorce as obtained in fraudem legis).
48. Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 461, 476 (1813).
49. Id. at 472.
50. Meili, Ein Specimet. ans der holldidischen Schule des internationwlen
Privatrechts (Ulricus Huber 1636-1694), 8 Z. INT. Pa. Sm. R. 189, 190 (transl.
Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 19, at 158).
51. For an enumeration of some of the meanings of the term "territoriality,"
see NussBAum, op. cit. supra note 26, at 40 n.29.
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national sense. 2 Beginnings of this approach may be found in Story's
treatment of interstate loan contracts. As stated elsewhere, early
American courts showed a solicitude for money lenders (strange to
modern ways of thinking and certainly to present law) " which led
them to apply "liberal" foreign laws over the usury laws of the forum. 4
If this practice was to be founded in deductive reasoning, it could not
be based on the doctrine of comity alone. To exclude the applicability
of the law of the forum, the legislating state had to be given a "power"
not explainable by that theory. And Story effected this exclusion by
reasoning "that no country can give to its own laws an extra-territorial
authority, so as to bind other nations. If it undertakes to legislate in
regard to acts or contracts performed elsewhere, it can claim for its
own laws no other validity than the comity of other nations may
choose to allow towards them." " While including a reference to
comity, this statement assumes a supernational assignment of exclusive
legislative authority to the state in which the contract is performed.
Significantly, Story's main authorities for this assumption were the
writings of those very continental jurists who, following in the foot-
steps of the statutists, had "endeavoured to collect principles, which
ought to regulate this subject among all nations," and whose efforts
he had rejected as adapted to "a common empire" rather than to an
independent nation."6
The extension of jurisdictional thinking into the field of choice
of law may have been facilitated in Anglo-American law by the fact
that in English law the separation of legislative and judicial powers has
been slower and perhaps less total than in countries governed by the
civil law,5 7 and that, in this country at least, this extension may have
filled, from a functional viewpoint, a gap created by a peculiarity of
the judicial process. Owing to a medieval concept of physical power,
the court is given authority over any defendant "served with process"
52. Cf. Schibsby v. Westenholz, L.R. 6 Q.B. 155 (1870). See in general CooX,
THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CoNFLICT OF LAws 83 et seq. (1942).
53. Cf. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 CoL. L.
REv. 1072 (1953).
54. This practice, equally early, raised the question what use there was "for
any legislature to pass a law for the protection of the weak and necessitous." Depau
v. Humphreys, 8 Mart. (N.s.) 1, 30 (La. 1829).
55. STORY, op. cit. supra note 30, at 253.
56. STORY, op. cit. supra note 30, at 27.
57. Cf Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 461, 467 (1813), where the court, inquiring
into the (judicial) jurisdiction of a foreign court, relied upon an apparently unre-
ported case in which a New Hampshire court's duty to give full faith and credit
to an administrator's legislative license to sell land in that state, was denied because
"it was not within the jurisdiction of the legislature of Massachusetts to license
the sale of lands in New Hampshire." See also, in general, Calder v. Bull, 3
Dall. 385 (U.S. 1798).
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within its territory. s If such purely accidental "jurisdiction" is to
create a claim to recognition even in a sister state with closer contacts
with the case, it may have seemed necessary in certain situations to
assume a compulsion of the judgment court to apply the law of that
state.
But it remained for Professor Beale fully to merge judgment
recognition and choice of law under an all-embracing concept of juris-
diction."9 Without accepting the statutists' stress on the interpretation
of the law to be applied, Beale thus built upon their assumption of a
supernational unitarian order without taking account of the fact that
at their time that assumption had a real or at least ideological basis
in the common Roman law long since defunct. What to Story had
been but an isolated solution of specific situations, thus became the
dogma of "legislative jurisdiction," which has decisively affected the
history of choice of law in this country. What could have become a
discipline subject to considerations and pressures of social policy like
all other branches of the law, came to be determined by an axiomatic
rule directly traceable to medieval sources: ". . . no statute has
force to affect any person, thing, or act . . . outside the territory
of the state that passed it." 0
This "rule" presupposes a complete system of a super-law deter-
mining the location of persons, things, and acts which has never existed
and will never exist, as well as a simplicity of choice of law principles
(such as lex delicti or lex contractus) which, if it has ever prevailed,
has long yielded to progressing diversification and refinement. 1 More-
over, the concept of legislative jurisdiction is based on an analogy be-
tween foreign judgments and laws which has long ceased to apply. To
recognize a foreign judgment meant to give deference to an act of an-
other sovereign, to an expression of his will and opinion. It is true that
58. See Ehrenzweig and Mills, Personal Service Outside the State, 41 CALIF.
L. REV. 383 (1953); and in general Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 MICH.
L. REv. 1, 9 (1949) ; MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 85 (1952).
59. Cf. 1 BEALE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 85 (1900);
Beale, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1920, The Conflict of Laws, 34 HARv. L.
REV. 50 (1920) ; 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAwS 308 (1935). For a bibliography about
this "teacher and writer, unrivalled since Story's time," see Cheatham, American
Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARv. L. REv. 361, 365
(1945).
60. 1 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws 312 (1935).. The exception omitted in this
quotation, i.e., that concerning the state's power over its citizens abroad, is not here
pertinent. See also Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARv. L. av.
241 (1923).
61. In addition a law of conflicts of conflict of laws has been an essential part of
our law of conflicts ever since Kahn's [1 ABH. ZUM INTERN. PRIVATRECHT 48 (Germany
1928)] and Bartin's investigations [De I'impossibilit6 d'arriver a la mppression
dflnitive des conflits de lois, 24 J. DR. INT. PR. 225, 466, 720 (France 1897)].
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the same observation applied to some extent to legislative acts prompted
by a desire to remedy individual evils. When and in so far as older
statutes served this purpose, their similarity to judicial acts may, there-
fore, have justified to some extent a concept of legislative "jurisdic-
tion." But no such similarity exists between judgments and modern
statutes phrased in general and abstract terms. If we choose, never-
theless, to apply such statutes of a foreign sovereign, we do so although
the latter has ordinarily been unaware, and may even have disapproved,
of such application. And, on the other hand, we neither violate inter-
national comity nor foreign legislative jurisdiction if we refuse to ap-
ply such statutes.
Notwithstanding inherent theoretical difficulties,62 a jurisdictional
approach to the recognition of foreign legislation might have remained
manageable if Story's successors had limited it, as Story in effect did,
to certain types of statutes as to which deference to another sovereign
perhaps justified the jurisdictional analogy. This, however, Story's
successors ' did not do, and, indeed, could not do. The "original sin"
of the compromise inevitably created new problems.
62. As to repeated and recent attempts of the Supreme Court to overcome these
difficulties in certain selected fields of choice of law, see, e.g., Dodd, The Power of the
Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39
HARV. L. REV. 533 (1926); Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6
VAND. L. REV. 581 (1953) ; Rheinstein, Das Kollisionsrecht im System des
Verfassungsrechts der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 1 FaSTSCHRIFT FUR ERNST
RABEL 539 (1954).
63. Story's work has several counterparts in Europe. Friedrich Carl von
Savigny, the founder of the Historical School of legal philosophy, rejected both
Wfchter's [Ueber die Collision der Privatrechtsgesetze verschiedener Staaten, 24
ARCHIV FUR DIE zIvILISTISCHE PRAxIs 230 (Germany 1841)] resort to the lex fori
and Story's comity theory. Though admitting the national source of all conflicts
law, Savigny insisted on the demands of a supernational "community of law," based
on a common Christian culture, mutual interest, and the postulate of "uniformity
of decision," i.e., the need for identical decisions of each case wherever brought.
(This principle, never totally forgotten, seems to have gained renewed attention.
See PAGENSTECHER, DER GRUNDSATZ DES ENTSCHEIDUNGSEINKLANGS IM INTER-
NATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT (1951)). Savigny assumed that, by analyzing the "legal
nature" of the foreign elements of a case, the law best applicable to it could be
ascertained. His stress in this connection on the "seat" of an obligation, though
often ridiculed ("obligations do not sit at all or, if they do, they sit on two stools,"
BRINZ, LEHREBUCH DER PANDEKTEN 102 (2nd ed. 1873)), has remained highly in-
fluential. His approach, though sharing Story's inconsistent combination of unitarian
and pluralistic elements, greatly influenced such French writers as Bartin and
Despagnet, such English writers as Phillimore and Westlake, and the Italians Fiore
and Diena. See SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS AND THE LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND
TIME (Guthrie trans. 1869); GUTZWILLER, DER EINFLUSS SAVIGNYS AUF DIE
ENTWICKLUNG DES INTERNATIONALPRIVATREcHTS (1923); MARIDAKIS, DIE INTER-
NATIONALPRIVATREcHTLIcHE LEHRE SAVIGNYS IM LICHTE SEINER REcHTSENTSTEHUNGS-
THEORIE, FESTSCHRIFT HANS LEWALD 309 (1953); and in general, Yntema, The
Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. Comp. L. 297, 309 (1953).
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, in 1851, gave his famous speech on "Nationality
as the Basis of the Law of Nations" in which, following a principle first adopted in
the French Civil Code, he gave the decisive impulse to that movement which has
since, in civil law countries, led to the far-reaching displacement of the domicile
principle still prevalent in Anglo-American law. Moreover, distingushing between
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Vested Rights
Once foreign law was to be given recognition on jurisdictional
grounds, it seemed hardly feasible to exclude from this recognition a
common law which, increasingly, had come to differ from state to state.
The Restaters avoided this discrimination under their theory of "vested"
rights and obligations " which they borrowed from a time-honored
concept developed by the same law of nations, that had given to Story
the concept of jurisdiction. 5 They were assisted in the creation of this
theory by a shift in the concept of conflicts law itself.
As we have seen, the comity element of Story's teaching is con-
cerned with relations between sovereigns, and thus truly a concept of
international law. But, as Story knew, the law of conflicts is "chiefly
seen and felt in its application to the common business of private per-
sons, and rarely rises to the dignity of national . . . contro-
versies." 66 This realization later induced Lord Blackburn to deny the
law of France the power "to bind the whole world" by a judgment
which, lacking "jurisdiction," failed validly to impose an (ubiquitous)
"obligation" on the defendant.6T Though circular in character-
whether or not such an obligation exists must, like "jurisdiction,"
again be determined by superlaw concepts-Blackburn's terminology
the rules created in the interest of private persons and those for the protection of
public order, Mancini accepted an international obligation to recognize only the
former. Largely pluralistic in its result (stressing the public policy exception), this
theory is unitarian in its character. Mancini has been followed in Belgium by
Laurent and in France by Andr6 Weiss, and has had considerable impact on
European legislation (e.g., the Saxon Code of 1863). He collaborated in the drafting
of the "Preliminary Provisions" of the Italian Code of 1865 which have been in
part continued in the conflicts provisions of the new Code of 1939. On Story's
counterparts in Latin-America, Augusto Teixeira de Freitas (Brazil) and Bello
(Chile), see VALLADXO, 0 DESENVOLVIMENTO DO DIRITO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
NAS LEGISLAC6ES Dos EsTADos AmERICANos, ADAMEMIA INTERAMERICANA DE
DEREcHo COMPARADO E INTERNACIONAL, CURSOS MONOGRAPHICOS 109, 139, 161
(1948). See also Nadelmann, De L'Organisation et de la Juridiction des Cours de
Justice, aux Etats Unis d'Amerique par M. Joseph Story, 30 B.U.L. Rxv. 382 (1950),
for translations and discussions of two early articles by Story in foreign legal
periodicals, explaining the American system to Continental scholars.
64. The phrase "foreign created rights" appears in 3 BEALE, CASES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 501 (1902), and in 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 106 (1916) but
was eliminated by him in the Restatement. Concerning the continuing identification
of the Restatement with the theory of vested rights, see Cheatham, American
Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REv. 361, 385
(1945); Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 65 HARv. L. REv. 822, 823 (1950).
Beale's theory of vested rights has been traced through DIcEY, DIGEST OF THE LAW
OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed. 1896) and
HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE (lst ed. 1890) directly to HunEa,
PRAELECTIONES. See Yntema, Dicey: An American Commentary, 4 INT. L.Q. 1
(1951); Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. CoMp.
L. 297, 308 (1953).
65. See STORY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 494, citing Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 240,
269, 270 (U.S. 1808), involving public international law.
66. STORY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 9.
67. Schibsby v. Westenholz, L.R. 6 Q.B. 155 (1870).
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justified perhaps the use of the term "private international law." This
expression, first adopted by Story " and later abandoned in this country,
has, as "international private law," become common usage abroad, 9
and has prepared the ground for the theory of "vested rights."
According to the Restatement, "a problem of jurisdiction" con-
cerns the "extent to which a state may create interests which will be
recognized in other states," '0 and such interests, whether based upon
statute or common law rules, "may, in certain cases, depend upon the
law in force of some other state or states." T' These (unitarian) state-
ments, which assume an "extraterritorial" effect of foreign laws
through the creation of ubiquitous interests, are, like the concept of
an international jurisdiction, irreconcilable with the Restatement's
(pluralistic) proposition that "the only law in force in the sovereign
state is its own law." 72
At first glance, the vested rights theory,78 like that of vested
"obligations," appears but as another formulation of the jurisdiction
test to the effect that if, and only if, a right was "vested" in the plain-
tiff by a foreign court "having jurisdiction," the foreign judgment is
entitled to recognition.74  Once the test of recognition is thus shifted
from the source of the law (jurisdiction) to its product (obligation and
68. SToRY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 9, 25. PILLET AND NinoE, DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PRivA 30 (1924), trace the term back to Story.
69. Cf. FOELIX, DRoiT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt (1843) ; ScHAEFNER, ENTwICiLtuJG
DES INTERNATIONALEN PR-VATRECHTS (1841).
70. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1, comment a (1934).
71. Id. § 1.
72. Professor Cheatham sees in this pronouncement an essential difference be-
tween the vested rights theory of the Restatement and the theory of the statutists
who assumed validity in the forum of the foreign law as such (see note 10 supra).
Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV.
L. REv. 361, 365 (1945). Both theories have in common, however, the assump-
tion of a supernational legal order.
73. NuSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (1943). For a
list of opponents of this theory, see id. at 31, 65. It is not limited to this country.
In Germany, Zitelmann and Frankenstein may be mentioned as representing a move-
ment which is trying to derive conflicts law from international law. In France,
Antoine Pillet advocated a theory of vested rights somewhat related to, though not
identical with, the theory of the statutists. And Niboyet only recently succeeded in
having a vested rights doctrine incorporated in the Draft of the new Civil Code.
Cf. Nadelmann and von Mehren, Codification of French Conflicts Law, 1 Am. J.
Comp. L. 404, 420 (1952) (Art. 21 of the Draft). See also Niboyet, Territoriality
and Universal Recognition of Rules of Conflict of Laws, 65 HAgv. L. REv. 582
(1952). In Italy, Anzilotti's original "material reception" theory, though pur-
portedly based on local law, would incorporate therein the entire foreign law. In
Great Britain, Dicey is the great protagonist of the vested rights approach which
is fully shared by Schmitthoff, while Cheshire and Graveson incline to a criticaT
view. See particularly Yntema, Dicey: An American Commentary, 4 INT. L.Q. 1
(1951); id., The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 Am. J. Comp.
L. 297, 307 (1953).
74. Cf. Chief Justice Marshall in Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 240, 268 (U.S.
1808), examining the jurisdiction ("power") of the first forum to determine "whether
its sentence has changed the right of property."
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right), Story's jurisdictional discrimination between statute and com-
mon law has disappeared. But so has, at the same time, the last excuse
for the analogous treatmeat of foreign judgments and foreign law for
the purposes of recognition.75  The compromise has failed. A new be-
ginning must first overcome the strong support which the inconsisten-
cies appearing in Story's and the Restaters' formulations have found in
the opinions of three great American jurists.
Holmes, Hand and Goodrich
Justice Holmes' conceptualistic views in the law of conflicts con-
trast strangely with his iconoclastic realism in other fields of the law.
Again and again we find Justice Holmes basing his opinions in con-
flicts cases on the tacit or express assumption of that "transcendental
body of law outside of any particular state," whose existence he denied
so vigorously elsewhere; 76 i.e., a body of law which endows each state
with the "power" to create obligations 7 and rights entitled to recogni-
tion and enforcement by other states. And instead of functional ra-
tionalizations of his assumptions of the kind so well known and dear
to us from Holmes' constitutional opinions, we find metaphysical plati-
tudes such as the statement that the determination of the exchange rate
as of the date of breach rather than the date of judgment flows "from
fundamental theory," 78 or that the constitutionality of non-forfeiture
75. In a series of articles, Professor Briggs (while admitting the theoretical
untenability of a theory which claims full power for each forum to devise its own
choice of law rule and yet attributes to foreign states an independent "jurisdiction"
for the creation of rights and obligations) has attempted to defend "jurisdictional
thinking" in view of "the actual function and operation" of American conflicts
law. Briggs, Utility of the Jurisdictional Principle it a Policy Centered Conflict
of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 667, 707 (1953). See also Briggs, The Jurisdictional-
Choice-of-Law in Conflict Rules, 61 HA v. L. REv. 1165 (1948) ; Briggs, The Dual
Relationship of the Rules of Conflict of Laws in the Succession Field, 15 Miss. L.J.
77 (1943). It is submitted, however, that once the power terminology has been
found wanting in its theoretical foundation, it has lost its sole claim to usefulness.
Such factual basis as may be stated for the forum's habits of recognition can and
must be developed without the aid or hindrance of an obsolete terminology.
76. Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab
and Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532 (1928) (dissenting opinion concerning the
Swift v. Tyson doctrine). It is this denial which only recently has made the
Justice the object of bitter attacks. But see FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 454 (3d
ed. 1953) for a detached re-appraisal.
77. The Justice preferred the Latin term "obligatio" to the English word
"obligation," perhaps because of the broader scope (comprising both torts and con-
tracts) and more clearly defined meaning of the Roman concept. Slater v. Mexican
Nat. R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904). "Obligatio est juris vinculum quo necessitate
astringimur alicujus solvendae rei. . . ." INsT. 3, 13. Cf. Mulhall v. Fallon, 176
Mass. 266, 57 N.E. 386 (1900) ; Slater v. Mexican Nat R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) ;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1913); Zimmermann v.
Sutherland, 274 U.S. 253 (1927); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280
U.S. 204, 216 (1930) (dissent). But see again, Frankfurter, J., in Levinson v.
Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 652 (1953).
78. Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71, 80 (1925).
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statutes of the lex contractus is based on "the first principles of legal
thinking." 71 Several reasons have been suggested for this attitude
so strangely out of place in the searching mind of this great judge.
Lack of knowledge in the field, traumatic predilection for the power
concept due to early experience as a soldier, 0 as well as adherence to a
rigidity "innate in the common law," "I have been blamed for this devia-
tion. It would, however, seem more likely that Justice Holmes was
prompted by an ideology similar to that of Joseph Story and Joseph
Beale, i.e., the earnest, though frustrated, desire to promote and stabilize
interstate and international relations. 2
While Holmes and the Restaters chose to fight for the restoration
of the past, that other great American conflicts scholar, Judge Learned
Hand, trying to follow both Holmes and new trends, has offered "us
another compromise. To him an obligation arising from a foreign tort
is not, as it was to Holmes, 3 one existing under the foreign law. For
"no court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign"; 4 and,
if the forum looks to the law of the foreign sovereign, it is merely to
impose "an obligation of its own as nearly homologous as possible to
that arising in the place where the tort occurs." ' But while Judge
Hand's "local law" theory 836 thus purports to reject the assumption
79. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 214 (1922). Professor
Rheinstein suspects that Justice Holmes used this phrase with a "suppressed smile."
Rheinstein, supra note 62, at 553. Cf. note 82 infra.
80. Reiblich, The Conflicts of Laws Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holnes, 28 GEO.
L.J. 1, 21, 22 (1939). For a list of the Justice's early opinions as a state judge,
see Note, 44 HARV. L. RaV. 717, 801 (1931).
81. NussBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 18, n.39 (1943).
82. This assumption is supported by the fact that Holmes, apparently when not
speaking from the bench, took a considerably different view. In response to Sir
Frederic Pollock's commendation of Pillet [sur un point peu apercu de la doctrine
de Dicey, 50 Ryv. DE D. INT. 345 (France, 3d Ser. 1923)], Holmes calls it "a
humbug" if "the virtuous Pillet" thinks that private international law means more
than the law actually applied in each case "because the Court speaking for the
Sovereign damn chose to ... " 2 HOLMEs-POLLocK LaTTERs 137, 138 (Howe
ed. 1941).
83. Cf. Holmes, J., in Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S.
517 (1926) (enforcing an obligation "arising from German law alone").
84. Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 768, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), aff'd, 299 Fed. 538
(2d Cir. 1924) aff'd with modifications sub nom. Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71
(1925), where Justice Holmes referred to a "liability already fixed by law." See
also Hand, J., in Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 83 F.2d 168 (2d Cir.
1936).
85. Guinness v. Miller, supra note 84. See also The James McGee, 300
Fed. 93, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Direction der Discontogesellschaft v. United States
Steel Corp., 300 Fed. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), aff'd, 267 U.S. 22 (1925); Sieg-
mann v. Meyer, 100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938); Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68
F.2d 942, 944 (2d Cir. 1934).
86. Cf. Donley, The Modern Influence in the Conflict of Laws, 36 W. VA. L.Q,
217 (1930) ; de Slovire, The Local Law Theory and its Implications in the Conflict
of Laws, 41 HARV. L. REv. 421 (1928); Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the
Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928); NussDAum, PRINCIPLES OF PRIvATz
INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (1943).
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of a transcendental rule of choice, it is still one of "divided allegiance" 17
in repeating as an axiom the assumption of a "foreign" tort or contract,
the place of which is determined by an implied supernational standard."
Where suit was brought against the New York owner of a car involved
in an Ontario accident, Ontario law, by imputing the driver's liability
to the defendant, would have "to reach beyond its borders," claiming
"extra-territorial effect." 89 And "people cannot by agreement sub-
stitute the law of another place. . . . Some law must impose the
obligation, and the parties have nothing whatever to do with
that. . . . " This conception of conflicts law, as one based on what
Judge Hand himself calls a territorial "legislative jurisdiction," " is
far removed still from Walter Wheeler Cook's definitive break with
compromise. 2 And so is the teaching of one of our foremost conflicts
judges and writers, Judge Goodrich. Formerly a faithful follower of
the Restatement, he has recently disavowed it at least in part and antici-
pates further changes. For: "To the extent one abandons the cate-
gorical imperative he slips away from the dogmas of Joseph H.
Beale. . . ." 3 Those who believe that these dogmas should be com-
pletely abandoned might prefer an even more determined "yielding
place to new." "
We have seen that unitarian compromise characterizes the theories
of Holmes and the Restaters who purport to improve on Story's by
deriving perfect pluralism from a perfect unitarian order; and of
Learned Hand who hopes to escape inconsistency by a new pluralistic
definition of an ubiquitous obligation. Unitarian salvation is occa-
sionally even expected from a new international order " beyond pres-
87. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REv.
1210, 1211 (1946).
88. See also New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 104 F.2d 665, 668
(2d Cir. 1939) where a preconceived notion of the place of assignment caused what
the dissent characterized as a "tortuous" course of reasoning.
89. Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942, 943, 944 (2d Cir. 1934).
90. E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931), approved
by Judge Hand as late as 1946 in Great Lakes Transit Corp. v. Marceau, 154 .F.2d
623, 627 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Louis Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships Ltd., 43
F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1930); and in general Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the
Conflict of Laws, 53 COL. L. REv. 1072, 1073 (1953).
91. Siegmann v. Meyer, 100 F.2d 367, 368 (2d Cir. 1938).
92. Cf. Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARV. L. REv. 822, 832
(1950), suggesting that Judge Hand's theory should be distinguished from Cook's
"local law theory" as the "homologous right theory," thus indicating an obvious
affinity to the theory of "vested" rights.
93. GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAWS, p. v (3d ed. 1949).
94. GooDRirc, Yielding Place to New: Rest v. Motion in the Conflict of Laws,
50 COL. L. REv. 881 (1950).
95. See, e.g., Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law of Nations Doctrine in the
Conflict of Laws, 42 CoL. L. REv. 189 (1942); Riesenfeld, Book Review, 3 U. OF
CHi. L. REv. 153 (1935) ; Sohn, New Bases for Solution of Conflict of Laws Prob-
leins, 55 HARv. L. PyEv. 978 (1942); Cowles, Judicial Review in Conflict of Laws,
21 NORDisK TmnssKcrnr FOR INTERNATIONAL RET 51 (1951) ; Stevenson, The Relation-
ship of Private International Law to Public International Law, 52 COL. L. R-v.
561 (1952).
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ent efforts to revitalize international treaty solutions,"6 or, more realis-
tically, in a comparative approach pooling the experiences of all coun-
tries. 7  On the other hand, there are those who have admitted defeat
and, forswearing both international and national schemes, have sought
refuge in a general appeal to justice," or in special rules for the equitable
adjustment of conflicts cases.9 But in all this turmoil judicial wisdom
and imaginative scholarship have been groping slowly and vigorously
for a new beginning.
A NEW BEGINNING: TH9E LAW
Not a Super-Law: Stone, Cook and Lorenzen
When the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws appeared
in 1934, the Supreme Court was about to abandon that position so
vocally expressed by Justice Holmes " which had lent support to the
vested rights approach of the Restaters. True, the Court, in a series of
cases from 1914 to 1930 1 had, under the Due Process Clause, as-
sumed the ubiquity of rights and obligations acquired under the lex
contractus by virtue of what Justice Holmes had referred to as "the
first principles of legal thinking." 102 But as early as 1918, Justice
Brandeis had maintained in a dissenting opinion that "there is no
constitutional limitation by virtue of which a statute enacted by a State
in the exercise of the police power is necessarily void if, in its opera-
tion, contracts made in another State may be affected." 103 And the
96. Cf. NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 46, 64 (1943).
97. The protagonist of this approach is Ernst Rabel, whose moumental work,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1945, 1947, 1950), is a unique source
of information.
98. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAgv. L. REv.
173 (1933), who, after recommending a number of standards, characterizes the end
product of the process of choice between forum and foreign law as the "search for
a just decision in the principal case." But cf. Cavers, Book Review, 56 HAv. L.
REv. 1170 (1943). See also Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws,
47 L.Q. REv. 483, 490 (1931); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HAiv. L.
REv. 881 (1951). For a similar trend abroad, see Frinkel, Der Irrgarten des
internationalen Privatrechts, 4 Z. AUSL. INT. P. R. 239 (Germany 1930).
99. Hoff, Adjustment of Conflicting Rights, 38 VA. L. REv. 745, 747, 749, 751
(1952) ; Hoff, Intensity Principle in the Conflict of Laws, 39 VA. L. REv. 437 (1953).
See also Kronstein, Crisis of "Conflict of Laws," 37 GEo. L.J. 483 (1949).
100. See text at notes 76 et seq. supra.
101. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S.
209 (1922); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See also John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken,
266 U.S. 389 (1924).
102. See note 79 supra.
103. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 264 U.S. 357, 382 (1918).
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same justice speaking for the majority of the Court twelve years later,
held at least the lex solutionis entitled to the same recognition as the
lex contractus."'0 Similar skepticism about the "vesting" power of
the lex contractus had been expressed by other justices long before
the Restatement." 5 It was Chief Justice Stone, however, who, both
prior and subsequent to the publication of the Restatement, most con-
sistently fought its underlying ideology, thus countering at the same
time the Court's repeated attempts at establishing the vested rights
theory not only through the alleged requirements of due process but
also through the back door of full faith and credit.
In the first respect, speaking for the Court only five years after
the publication of the Restatement, he found that at least two states,
that of the contract and that of the tort, were "competent to legislate"
as to workmen's compensation without denial of due process. 06 And
in the same case justice Stone rejected the full faith and credit clause
as a means of introducing a constitutional system of choice of law 107_
this in conspicuous contrast to his attitude concerning the recognition
of foreign judgments, as to which he felt that the very "purpose of the
full faith and credit clause" was to alter the "status of the several states
as independent foreign sovereignties." 101 He also refused to recognize
or to deny a state's "jurisdiction" to tax "by the choice of label, by
definition previously agreed upon," "I and most eloquently expressed,
in the following, now classic statement, his distaste for the rigidity of
vested rights and obligations. Rejecting the majority's argument that
full faith and credit had to be given to a sister state decree concerning a
104. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). The idea of legislative
jurisdiction, though diluted, was, however, maintained in this case, as it was in
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936) (opinion also
by Brandeis, J.).
105. Cf. Justice McKenna in American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber & Mfg.
Co., 250 U.S. 2 (1919) ; and Chief Justice Taft in National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922).
106. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of California, 294
U.S. 532 (1935) (rationalizing this result in part by assuming a new classification
under workmen's compensation). Cf. Beale, Social Justice and Business Costs-A
Study in the Legal History of Today, 49 HAxv. L. REv. 593, 603 (1936). See also
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
and Justice Stone's concurring opinion in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper,
286 U.S. 145, 163 (1932). For an analysis of his earlier opinion in Seeman v.
Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927), equally "renouncing a geo-
graphical test in favor of a teleological one," see Freund, supra note 87, at 1214.
Finally cf. Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941), rehearing
denied, 314 U.S. 716 (1942).
107. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of California, supra
note 106.
108. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943). Cf. Cheatham,
Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Magwlia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,
44 COL. L. Rav. 330 (1944).
109. Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422, 433, 438 (1935) (dissenting opinion). See
also Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
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child's support because only the state of the father's domicile had "the
power to impose" such a duty,"' Stone contrasted the (local) right
of the several states to pass their own laws with their (interstate)
"legislative jurisdiction."
"Between the prohibition of the due process clause, acting
upon the courts of the state from which such proceedings may be
taken, and the mandate of the full faith and credit clause, acting
upon the state to which they may be taken, there is an area which
federal authority has not occupied." I"
While doubt has since been cast on this statement, it alone would
justify Professor Cheatham's conclusion that "since Story wrote his
great treatise over one hundred years ago no member of the court has
contributed more than the late Chief Justice to conflict of laws." 112
Chief Justice Stone's rebellion against Justice Holmes' formalism
in conflict of laws finds its counterpart in Cook's and Lorenzen's studies
directed against the Restatement and other remnants of Story's juris-
dictional compromise. 113  While revolutionary at the time of their ap-
pearance, these studies have become the theoretical basis of virtually
all current research in the field, including Stumberg's important text on
the subject.
1 14
Contrary to the Restatement, which Cook has shown to be fal-
lacious in this respect,",' a state "can" affect "persons, things and
acts" anywhere in the world subject only to positive rules of interna-
tional or constitutional law not inherent "in the constitution of the
legal universe," so that "by far the larger number of the rules for the
solution of cases involvin'g the conflict of laws do not relate to the
'power' or 'jurisdiction' of the particular court or state.. ,
110. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933) (dissenting opinion).
Concerning the tenuous support of the Court's holding, see Ehrenzweig, Interstate
Recognition of Support Duties, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 382, 385 (1954).
111. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 214 (1933). Stressing the same
difference, the Chief Justice reached the opposite result in Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
112. Cheatham, Stone on Conflict of Laws, 46 COL. L. REV. 719, 733 (1946).
See also, in general, Freund, supra note 87; Rheinstein op. cit. supra note 62.
113. Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAW (1942).
For a list of authors following Cook's approach, see Cheatham, American Theorie's
of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARv. L. Rav. 361, 366, 389 (1945).
For a criticism, id. at 386. See also Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63
HARv. L. REV. 822 (1950). Lorenzen's writings are collected in SELECTED ARTICLES
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947). See particularly Developments in the Conflict
of Laws, 1902-1942, at 203.
114. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1951). See also CHESHIRE, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1952); NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1943); FALCONBRIDGE, ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT op LAWS (2d
ed. 1954).
115. Cook, op. cit. supra note 113, at 51.
116. Id. at 41.
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Thus Story's and Holmes' compromise, which combined a nationalist
pluralistic assertion of sovereignty tempered only by comity between
nations, with the internationalist, unitary notion of rights and ob-
ligations vested under a foreign legislative jurisdiction, could be con-
sidered obsolete were it not for the fact that the "local law theory" sup-
planting it appears to leave us without a guide.
Not "No Law": Outlook
Whether or not the Supreme Court's current attempts at reviving
"logical" theorems for the establishment of a constitutional scheme of
choice of law 117 will meet the failure of their predecessors, 1 -8 the local
law theory, though having effectively fought its opponents, does not
offer the final solution. This theory has "the defects of its qualities.
Laying the emphasis on the freedom of the forum state to do what it
wishes, it may engender the unfortunate attitude that the freedom
should be widely used. While in the early stages or the off-type cases
of any field of law it is essential that courts have freedom to achieve
justice, in the developed stages and the ordinary cases the need is for
doctrine which will point to the appropriate decision. So counterbal-
ancing emphasis is needed on the wisdom of ordinarily employing the
foreign law as guide in foreign transactions." 119
Moreover, before declaring our unconditional adherence to any
one of these theories, we should keep in mind that their differences may
bear significantly on highly practical issues, and often perhaps in a
manner not altogether desirable. True, we might well prefer the local
117. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); First Nat. Bank of Chicago v.
United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952), impliedly assuming a constitutional com-
pulsion to apply the law of the place of wrong as "creating" the cause of action.
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953), permitting application of the
statute of limitations of the forum to such a "foreign cause of action," may or may
not indicate a partial withdrawal from this position. Justice Jackson seemed to
be the principal advocate of this approach on the Court. See Jackson, Full Faith and
Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COL. L. REv. 1 (1945); and the
Justice's concurring opinion in First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines,
supra.
118. See text at notes 76, 101 et seq. supra; and, in general, Cheatham, A
Federal Nation and Conflict of Laws, 22 RocKY MT. L. Irav. 109 (1950); Rhein-
stein, supra note 62, at 577.
119. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility,
58 HARv. L. REv. 361, 386 (1945). ". . . the remorseless logic of the dogma of
sovereignty has driven the doctrine of conflicts law to the verge of a theoretic
chaos where its acolytes, bemused by nationalistic positivism, are like to lose the
vision of the grand objective in provincial worship of the lex fori." Yntema, The
Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 Am. J. Comrs. L. 297, 312 (1953).
Concerning a similar controversy in German conflicts law, see Kegel, Begriffs- und
Interessenjurisrudenz im Iternationalen Privatrecht, in FEsrscmuTv HANs
LawAnD 259 (1953).
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law theory because it supplies us with the most acceptable explanation
for what has so aptly been called the "homeward trend" in the law of
conflicts,12 and because this theory most easily avoids pseudo-problems
of inter-temporal conflicts law such as that concerning post-factual
changes in the "applicable" foreign law 121 or questions concerning the
availability of "machinery" for the enforcement of "foreign" rights
and obligations. 2 But in other ways a dogmatic local law theory may
give substance to old errors and induce new ones. Mere mention must
suffice of such problems as those concerning characterization and renvoi
under the lex fori or the lex causae, the treatment of foreign law as a
"fact" for purposes of proof, review and judicial notice, and finally the
"wide and unexplored" question of the relation between conflicts law
and the interspatial interpretation of domestic and foreign legal rules. 2 3
Fortunately, American courts, though often speaking in legalistic
terms, have in essence remained unaffected by sterile ideologies and
have kept open the way to a more realistic approach. Above all, the
exception of "public policy" 4 has been resorted to in order to reach
the proper result where a rigid formula would have sacrificed common
sense to "logic." But we should abandon the "unruly horse" of public
policy wherever we can. "Once you get astride of it, you never know
where it will carry you." .25 What at first appears as an exception
based on public policy or other general considerations, at one point
must become a new conflicts rule demanding formulation without re-
gard to dogmatic conceptions such as vested rights, legislative jurisdic-
tion, or local sovereignty.
We shall have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that the law of con-
flict of laws which has barely begun to crystallize in a few dozen gen-
eral maxims, if it is to mature into a full-fledged new branch of the
common law, will have to "be broken down to a very much larger
number of narrower rules of more specific application, until they are
similar to the rules in all other fields of law." "0
In a series of studies, I have tried to demonstrate the growth of
new conflicts rules under the aegis not of the fancy of a super-law or
120. NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIvATE INTENATIONAL LAW 37, 70 (1943).
121. Cf. id. at 69.
122. Cf. Slater v. Mexican National R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904). See text at
notes 64 et seq. supra.
123. Cf. NUssBAuM, op. cit. supra note 120, at 71 et seq.
124. For a history and analysis of this concept, see particularly NussEAuM,
op. cit. supra note 120, at 110; and LLOYD, PUBLIC POLICY, A CoMPARATm STUDY
IN ENGLIS H AND FRENcH LAW (London 1953).
125. Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824).
126. Rheinstein, Book Review, 28 IND. L.J. 443, 449 (1953). For a unique
attempt at classifying the policies governing the progress of conflicts law, see
Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoL. L. RFv. 959 (1952).
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the anarchy of "local law," but of a body of common law which, while
infinitely more complex than in other legal disciplines, is equally acces-
sible to patient analysis. In these studies in widely scattered fields, I
have tried to show that within the traditional doctrine of "jurisdiction'"
courts are approaching a new concept of competency similar to that of
the civil law and yet superior to it owing to gradual refinement from
case to case; 127 that the lex loci delicti in the conflicts law of torts,
having long ceased to be the self-evident basis of vested rights, legisla-
tive jurisdiction or Justice Holmes' fairness test, has come to reflect
,new economic and special policies pressing for recognition; 128 that di-
vergent policies in the conflicts law of contracts, too, foreshadow new
classifications that may yet reach beyond the field of conflicts into do-
mestic law; ' and that the custody of children 130 and the enforcement
of duties to support '8' are no longer subject either to "logical" rules
of jurisdiction or arbitrary tests of "welfare."
To assist courts in their groping for new generalizations much,
much more has been done by others,' and much, much more remains
127. Ehrenzweig and Mills, supra note 58. The "power" rationale of jurisdiction,
after having yielded as to corporations to the "minimum contact" test of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), seems to be about to lose its impact
on the law of jurisdiction over individuals, unless we wish to find "power" where a
state bases personal jurisdiction on the mere fact that the defendant was a resident
of the state at the time the cause of action arose. Cf. Allen v. Superior Court, 41
Cal.2d 306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953).
128. The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason versus
the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. Rlv. 1 (1951); Der Tatort im Ainerikanischen
Kollisionsrecht der Ausservertraglichen Schadenersatzantsprche, FEsTscHaFT FUR
ERNSTR 1ABEL 655 (Germany 1954). Contrary to the Restatement's exclusive reliance
on the law of the place of harm, courts have never applied this law to torts primarily
governed by admonitory policies.
129. Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 CoL. L. REv. 1072 (1953).
Contrary to widely accepted notions, party autonomy in choice of law has never
been recognized by American courts with regard to contracts of mere adhesion.
130. Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees: Law and Reason versus the
Restatement, 51 MicH. L. Rzv. 345 (1953) ; Recognition of Custody Decrees Rendered
A broad, 2 Am. J. ComP. L. 167 (1953). According to Section 147 of the Restatemenb
and the comment thereto, a custody decree rendered in the state having local and
"therefore" interstate jurisdiction as the state of the child's domicile (§ 117) "cannot
be reexamined either in the state where rendered or in another state," without proof
of a change of circumstances. American courts, following a "policy" safeguarding
the child's welfare, have, in hundreds of decisions, preferred to recognize foreign
custody decrees without regard to the rendering court's "jurisdiction" and notwith-
standing attempts to prove changes of circumstances, in those cases where a parent
had tried to escape a foreign decree; and, on the other hand, have disregarded foreign
decrees claiming "jurisdiction," with or without a proof of change of circumstances,
in those cases where the decree had been obtained unfairly. This "clean hands" rule
of "public policy" in the field of child custody seems to be pressing for formulation
whether or not reconcilable with concepts of vested rights or jurisdiction.
131. Interstate Recognition of Support Duties, supra note 110.
132. Among most recent writings, see A Symposium on Conflict of Laws, 6
VAND. L. REv. 441-742 (1953) (including papers by Professors Carnahan, Cheatham,
Cowen, Falconbridge, Leflar, Morris, Rabel, Reese, Stimson and Stumberg) ; and,
e.g., Taintor, Adoption in the Conflict of Laws, 15 U. oF Pirr. L. REv. 222 (1954) ;
or Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. oF CHI. L. REv.
620 (1954).
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to be done over many decades to come. To "continue" at this time
what purports to be a systematic "restatement" of a body of law, thus
seems premature. The work of the American Law Institute in this
field should, I submit, either be postponed as a whole, or limited to
those topics in which law can be truly "restated",-lest American con-
flicts law relapse into that sterile confusion of (pluralistic) "comity"
and (unitarian) "jurisdiction" from which it has just barely begun to
recover.
